Publication: Sunday Times
Issued:
Date: 2003-08-17
Reporter: Mzilikazi wa Afrika, Ranjeni Munusamy, Andre Jurgens, Jessica Bezuidenhout
Ramaphosa Steps into Arms Row
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Publication |
Sunday Times
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Date |
2003-08-17 |
Reporter
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Mzilikazi wa Afrika, Ranjeni Munusamy, Andre Jurgens, Jessica
Bezuidenhout
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Web Link
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www.sundaytimes.co.za
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ANC heavyweight Cyril Ramaphosa is set to meet Scorpions chief
Bulelani Ngcuka today to open discussions on a possible
plea bargain deal in the cases of Deputy President Jacob Zuma, his financial
adviser Schabir Shaik and former Transport Minister Mac Maharaj.
The three are being probed by the Scorpions.
Zuma is alleged to have solicited a bribe
from a foreign arms dealer through Shaik while Maharaj
is under investigation over money paid to him by Shaik between 1996 and 2000,
including the time when he was in the Cabinet.
Ramaphosa confirmed today's meeting with Ngcuka, and that he had
been asked to mediate in the ongoing dispute which has rocked the ANC and the
government.
"I have spoken to various parties, including ANC
secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe, but there is no mediation as yet."
Ramaphosa said he would only know to what extent he would be
involved in the mediation process after today's meeting with Ngcuka.
He added that he was not aware of exactly what any deals might
entail.
Ngcuka said "1 made a promise to President [Thabo] Mbeki
that I am not going to comment on the ongoing investigation, and I am not going
to change that."
But Scorpions spokesman Sipho Ngwema confirmed that a meeting
had been scheduled between Ngcuka and Ramaphosa for today.
Three weeks ago the Sunday Times published a list of 35
questions which the Scorpions had put to Zuma following three years of
investigation into SA's controversial arms deal.
It was during that week, when the country was gripped by
political mud-slinging between Zuma's office, the ANC and the Scorpions, that
the first attempts to reach a settlement began in secret.
Although it has been variously claimed that Shaik's
brother, Yunis, or Ivor Powell of the Scorpions,
initiated discussions, the Sunday Times can confirm that a flurry
of behind-the-scenes talks on this issue have taken place between
- Yunis Shaik and Powell;
- Ngcuka and lawyer Ismail Ayob representing Maharaj;
- Ngcuka and Maharaj;
- Yunis Shaik and Zuma;
- Ngcuka and Ramaphosa; and
- Ramaphosa and Motlanthe.
The Sunday Times understands that the proposed deal with Maharaj
involves ensuring that no criminal charge are brought against him but that his
wife, Zarina, could face a number of charges relating to her company.
Maharaj, who this week resigned as non-executive director of
FirstRand, is being investigated by the Scorpions over money he received from
Shaik, whose company, Nkobi Holdings, benefited from two government tenders.
Announcing his resignation, Maharaj said that an independent
inquiry by the banking group had cleared him of allegations of corruption.
He received a R1.1-million payout.
Ayob - who is former President Nelson Mandela's lawyer acted as
an emissary between Maharaj and the Scorpions.
He said yesterday "I am aware of the matter, but I do not
want to comment."
Maharaj said "There is nothing for me to mediate about. If
Ngcuka has something to mediate about, that's fine."
Zuma and Shaik are being probed over a R500 000 bribe Zuma
allegedly tried to solicit from French arms company Thales.
It is understood that the proposed deal
could involve the charges against Zuma being dropped and Shaik pleading
guilty to negotiated charges.
If this succeeded, a plea bargain would
then be entered into with Shaik.
Shaik said he was not aware of the proposed mediation process.
"I appreciate any assistance that is rendered with regards
to resolving this matter.
But until such time as such propositions are put to my legal
team, I am unable to comment on what my position would be.
On Friday, Zuma submitted a response to some of the 35 questions
posed by the Scorpions.
His spokesman (sic) Lakela Kauda said last night "that is
the only process he is dealing with at the moment."
With acknowledgements to Mzilikazi
wa Afrika, Ranjeni Munusamy, Andre Jurgens, Jessica Bezuidenhout and the Sunday Times.
- This article was published on
Sunday 2003-08-17 just six days before
Bulelani Ngcuka and Penuell Maduna hosted a joint press conference
on Saturday
2003-08-23. Below is a digital transcript of
the official press release.
Thomson-CSF followed.
But looks whose on the record
here as being involved :
- Cyril Ramaphosa
- Sipho Ngwema
- Ismail Ayob
And who else is clearly involved :
- Bulelani Ngcuka
- Kgalema Motlanthe
Please someone tell me that there wasn't a
deal that went down from the very highest level to get Jacob Zuma
and Mac Maharaj off the hook.
There is the clearest of indications of interference in the
prosecuting processes.
If there was any bona fide discussion regarding plea bargains then
firstly Schabir Shaik would have been involved (because one could
not just offer this to his co-accused and not him), and secondly all
these unauthorised third party as interlocutors. Genuine plea
bargain negotiations would have invloved the potential accused
persons and their appointed legal representatives.
This all points to an extra-judicial process that lead to an
unlawful decision (i.e. not to charge Jacob Zuma along with Schabir
Shaik).and heads should start rolling faster than under the National
Razor between 5 September 1793 – 28 July 1794.
-
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reign_of_Terror
Do it or must I start sharpening my razor?
Press Statement by :
Bulelani Thandabantu Ngcuka, National Director of Public
Prosecutions
on the :
Decision on whether to prosecute after the completion of the
investigation against Deputy President, Mr Jacob Zuma, Schabir
Shaik and others
23 August 2003
Introduction
1. Today, after a long and difficult investigation, I have come
to pronounce the decision of the National Prosecuting Authority on
whether to prosecute the Deputy President of the Republic of South
Africa, Mr Jacob Zuma. This decision has been reached after what I
consider to be one of the most difficult investigations that the
National Prosecuting Authority and indeed our young democracy had to
witness - the investigation and possible prosecution of the Deputy
President Zuma.
2. A detailed report on the evidence and facts of this investigation
has been handed over to Dr Penuell Maduna MP, the Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development, in terms of Section 35(2)(b)
of the National Prosecuting authority Act, 32 of 1998.
3. As the National Prosecuting authority we are not in a position to
publicly release the details of that report, as it could compromise
a prosecution we intend to launch against some of the persons
referred to therein. We also believe that the public release of such
details might possibly infringe on those person's constitutional
right to a fair trial.
A. The reason for the NPA investigation
4. The subject matter of the report relates to an investigation
that was carried out by the Directorate of Special Operations ("the
DSO"). The DSO is a component of the National Prosecuting Authority
("the NPA"), established by section 7 of the National Prosecuting
Authority Act, No. 32 of 1998 ("The Act"). The NPA is in turn, a
constitutional institution, established bysection 179 of the
Constitution and as determined in the Act. In terms of section 7 of
the Act, the DSO is charged with :
"Investigating, and carrying out any functions incidental to
investigations;
Gathering, keeping and analyzing information; and where appropriate,
institute criminal proceedings and carry out any necessary functions
incidental to instituting criminal proceedings."
5. This investigation was a complex one, which at the end of it
required the exercise of discretion whether to prosecute any person
or persons. In deciding whether to prosecute, members of the
Prosecuting Authority are guided by the prosecution policy and
policy directives determined and issued in terms of section 24(1) of
the Act.
6. Part 4 of the Prosecution Policy is particularly relevant and
reads as follows:
In deciding whether or not to institute criminal proceedings against
an accused, prosecutors should asses whether there is sufficient and
admissible evidence to provide a reasonable prospect of a successful
prosecution. There must indeed be a reasonable prospect of a
conviction, otherwise the prosecution should not be commenced or
continued.
This test of a reasonable prospect must be applied objectively and
after careful deliberation..."
7. As a constitutional institution, the NPA is a fundamental pillar
of democracy, whose primary function is the promotion of the rule of
law in the area of criminal justice. There is a necessary
relationship between the principle of democracy and the rule of law,
because for a political system to have legitimacy, it must adhere to
constitutional values, enforce the rule of law, uphold law and order
and ensure peace, safety and security.
8. The rule of law implies that law is supreme and applies equally
to all; it requires the creation, maintenance and enforcement of an
order of laws, which are applicable to all and preserve and embody
the observance of law by all. The primary reason for the importance
of the rule of law is that it is inherently necessary to support,
sustain and maintain the emergence and growth of democracy.
9. In pursuit of the rule of law, and therefore in support of
democracy and constitutionalism, section 179 of the Constitution
enjoins the Prosecuting Authority to exercise its functions without
fear, favour or prejudice. This presupposes that members of the
prosecuting authority must at all times act reasonably, lawfully and
constitutionally, fairly and efficiently, and uphold the fundamental
rights of all citizens, including accused persons.
10. Any matter that is investigated and/or prosecuted by the
prosecuting authority is obviously and necessarily important and
significant. This matter, however, as will appear below, is of
particular significance and, as already stated, significantly in the
public interest. It is a matter, which involved allegations of
corruption. Corruption, by its very nature, undermines any
possibility of political stability, democratic governance and real
enjoyment of constitutionally guaranteed economic, social and
political rights. In the absence of strong constitutionalism and the
rule of law to tackle problems of democratic governance, the
enjoyment of economic, social and political rights is far from being
real.
B. Focus, purpose and nature of the report to the Minister
11. The report that was handed over to the Minister has been
written to account for the two year-investigation into allegations
of corruption flowing from Nkobi Group's acquisition of shareholding
in African Defence Systems ("ADS") and the role played by the Deputy
President, Mr Jacob Zuma in this arrangement.
12. The primary purpose of the report is to explain why we acted in
the way we did, what led to the investigations, how we conducted it
and what we have found.
13. We express the hope that the report would put the investigation
into perspective in view of media distortions, disinformation
campaigns and criticism against the investigation; and their
combined toll on the personal and professional lives of people and
parties involved.
C. The endeavour at all times to act reasonably, lawfully and
constitutionally
14. The decision to launch an investigation against the Deputy
President was taken after careful consideration of all the
implications of such an investigation. this because on the one hand,
public interest requires that allegations of corruption be
investigated properly, and on the other, that where aspersions are
cast on the credibility of the Deputy President of our country, we
act with due diligence.
15. What has initiated this investigation was the receipt of a faxed
letter concerning the alleged attempted solicitation of bribes from
the Thomson Group in connection with the arms acquisition process.
Correspondence received from a whistle-blower implicated Messrs
Thetard, Shaik and the Deputy President in this unfortunate affair.
This, together with evidence obtained from an auditing firm, and
other surrounding irregular factors, informed our decision in this
matter. In the result, we were satisfied that we had a reasonable
suspicion and thus no choice but to continue.
16. We also considered whether it was in the public interest or in
the interest of the administration of justice to initiate such an
investigation. we held the view that it was important for our
institution, the Deputy President and our country that an
investigation be authorised in order to dispel any notion of
impropriety.
17. From the outset we were concerned abut the need to ensure that
we conducted this investigation as discreetly as possible. We were
mindful of the harm or prejudice the media might cause both to the
integrity of the investigation itself and the credibility of the
Deputy President, should our investigation be known to them. We have
tried to maintain a balance between conducting a rigorous and
thorough investigation on the one hand, and according the Deputy
President the deference due to his office, on the other.
18. In doing so we have had to adopt procedures, which we do not
normally use. These include the following :
a) The authorisation for the investigation was crafted in such a
way, that no reference was made specifically to the Deputy
President.
b) when we took the decision to conduct searches in respect of
properties and/or premises belonging to Mr Schabir Shaik, Nkobi
and the Thomson groups, we excluded his premises and offices.
c) After obtaining legal advice, we avoided any reference to him
in our application for a search warrant brought before a judge
in chambers. Instead the phrase "a high-ranking government
official, called Mr X", was used. This position was also adopted
in all applications for mutual legal assistance and search
warrants in foreign jurisdictions.
d) When we realised that the Deputy President's identity was
deliberately disclosed by Mr Shaik in his 2nd application in the
Durban High Court (challenging our authority to question him in
terms of Section 28 of the NPA Act), we immediately wrote a
letter to the Minister of Justice advising him to inform the
Deputy President of this development, in order for him to take
whatever action he deemed necessary. The Minister did so.
e) during February this year we intimated counsel for Mr Zuma
our willingness to provide him with written questions in
advance, regarding the issues we require a response to. He
apparently refused. We could have subpoenaed him then, but opted
not to do so. In June this year when the issue recurred, we
provided him with a written set of questions and invited him to
respond, if he so wished.
20. Our investigating team quietly went about their business,
without putting any of the information around Mr Zuma in the public
domain. Only in November 2002, did the Mail & Guardian publish an
article about this investigation, having obtained access to the
affidavit of one of our investigators, which by then was a public
document in an application in the Durban High Court, brought by Mr
Shaik.
21. At the time we preferred not to join the media and public
clamour for confirmation and debate. This we did, because we do not,
as a rule, disclose details about sensitive investigations that are
underway. Equally, we do not inform subjects or suspects that we are
investigating them. It defeats the purpose of the exercise. Yet, in
this particular instance, we made an exception.
22. Both the Minister Maduna and the National Director informed the
Deputy President about this investigation shortly after it started.
23. In our view the investigating team has at all times acted in
accordance with constitutional imperatives and the law relating to
criminal investigations. Almost every "invasive" action such as
searches and confiscations have been subjected to judicial
oversight.
24. We did not leak the questions put to the Deputy President to
anyone else. Only two people in the entire organisations had the
questions, the National Director and one of his deputies. The
questions were given to the lawyers of the Deputy President. They
would know best.
25. We have never asked for nor sought mediation. We do not need
mediation and we do not mediate in matters of this nature. However,
we have no objection to people making representations to us, be it
in respect of prosecutions or investigations. In terms of section
22(4)(c) of the Act, we are duty bound to consider representations.
D. The ambit of the investiation
26. The investigation covered the following :
- Allegations of fraud and corruption in respect of certain
contracts and sub-contracts.
- The allegation of bribery and reference in correspondence,
which implies a solicitation of a bribe.
- Financial benefits made by Schabir Shaik and/or the Nkobi
Group and received by Mr Zuma/
- The undue use of public office to advance the private
business interests of the Nkobi group and/or Schabir Shaik.
27. Evidence was obtained through searches and seizures that were
conducted in Durban, France and Mauritius. Documentation was
obtained from various entities, including 118 bank accounts relating
to numerous entities and individuals. A vast number of witnesses
from across the business and private spectrum were interviewed,
consulted and questioned over the period.
28. The work of the investigating team has been compounded in no
small measure by the complexity and magnitude of the case. Much time
has been spent on drafting applications for search warrants, orders
and obtain evidence in three foreign jurisdictions and affidavits
opposing litigation in the High Court. Because this is to a large
extent an exercise in documentary analysis, the process of obtaining
company records, accounting files and bank statements, further
account for the time spent. Issuance of subpoenas and questioning of
reluctant witnesses scarcely available, whose legal representatives
often wanted further particulars before agreeing to appear, further
complicated things.
29. The French authorities have yet to respond to and comply with
our request for mutual legal assistance sent to them earlier this
year.
30. On 26 June 2002 Mr Schabir Shaik was summoned to appear before
investigators for questioning. He objected to the proceedings,
questioning the validity of section 28 (6) of the Act. Judge
McClaren delivered judgment in our favour on 18 July 2003 and on 6
August 2003 grated Mr Shaik leave to appeal. This one-year delay and
the current effect of the appeal caused us to rearrange our approach
to the investigation.
The Decision
31. The investigating team recommended that we institute a
criminal prosecution against Deputy President Zuma.
32. After careful consideration in which we looked at the evidence
and the facts dispassionately, we have concluded that, whilst there
is a prima facie case of corruption against the Deputy President,
our prospects of success are not strong enough. That means that we
are not sure if we have a winnable case.
a) Accordingly, we have decided not to prosecute the Deputy
President;
b) We tested our decision with a Senior Counsel who is very
skilled in these types of matters, and he concurred with our
decision;
c) As a matter of courtesy we informed Deputy President Zuma's
counsel of this decision;
d) We are charging Mr Schabir Shaik for various counts of
corruption, fraud, theft of company assets, tax evasion and
reckless trading;
e) We have decided to prosecute the Nkobi group of companies and
Thomson CSF on contraventions;
f) The legal representatives of the relevant parties have been
informed of this decision;
g) We will be referring the evidence we have against Alain
Thetard, Perrier and international companies like Thomson to the
French authorities for them to take appropriate action;
h) We will be referring the issue around declaration of gifts
and donations received by the Deputy President to Parliament for
their consideration.
Conclusion
33. The national interests of our young democracy and
institutions of governance demand that we be satisfied that the
facts are unassailable before we decide to institute criminal
prosecutions. In a case of this nature we can't prosecute if it is
not sufficiently winnable. At the same time, given the public
interest in this matter, we cannot continue with a prolonged
investigation that cast a shadow over the Deputy President of the
country, whilst we are not assured of the outcome.
34. The manner in which this matter has been handled in the past few
months leaves much to be desired. However I would be failing the
constitution and the people of our country as the national Director
of Public Prosecutions if I were to rush headlong into prosecution
simply to prove a point. This is not the time for point-scoring. I
have to put the interests fo the country above personal displeasure.
In the end, this case demonstrated the maturity of our democracy. We
conducted this investigation without any undue influence from the
executive or any arm of our government. That we were able to
finalise this investigation and make the decisions that we have,
without fear, favour or prejudice is victory to our young democracy.
These have been very difficult times to al who were involved in this
investigation in our organisation. I therefore want to thank the
member who were involved in this investigation for their hard work
and the sacrifices they have made.
Sipho Ngwema, our spokesperson, has gone through a very difficult
time in the past few weeks trying to take some of the pressure off
me. Ours is a thankless job. I thank Sipho for his support.
More importantly, I want to extend my greatest appreciation to Dr
Penuell Maduna, the Minister of Justice, for his unstinging (sic)
support. Minister, you've once more demonstrated political
leadership.
The National Prosecuting Authority will continue to strive to
realise its vision of "Justice in our society so that people can
live in freedom and security."
Thank you.
With acknowledgement to Bulelani
Thandabantu Ngcuka, National Director of Public Prosecutions.
-
http://www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za/special_items/statements/ngcuka_statemnt.htm