Government is already trumpeting the apparent success of its arms offset programme, in terms of which suppliers of equipment such as aircraft and submarines have to invest in projects in SA in exchange for multibillion-dollar contracts.

No one is saying the programme is not a success. What we are asking for is proof that it is a success.

This way, government will be able to silence those may critics who never believed the offset projects would generate between R70bn and R110bn in investment and create 65 000 jobs, as government promised in the beginning.

There are some very good reasons to doubt that the offset programme will achieve just this. The tainted history of offset programmes is among these. Another reason is that the rather credible institutions, such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation, Transparency International and the European Union, all think offsets are a scam.

Also, does government have the capacity to follow every cent (of R110bn) that the arms suppliers claim they are investing in SA? We don't think so. Furthermore, arms contractors are in the business of making as much money as possible by selling equipment. They are not in the business of building economic capacity in other countries. It is easy to guess which one of the two takes priority.

So if government claims the offset programme is successful, it should give us proof sufficient to sway its critics. An annual report on offsets presents a great opportunity to do this. But the latest report, like its predecessor, on offset obligations in nondefence activities fails to achieve this.

The 2004 report resembles a public-relations exercise, rather than a thorough analysis, backed up by facts and figures, off offset achievements and failures.

Offset obligations are measured in terms of investment made and sales generated. The report fails to say what has been achieved in total to date on these scores. The few figures that are mentioned in the report are not explained in terms of how they were calculated. Further fuelling suspicion about the offset issue is the fact that the report was about four months late.

The Democratic Alliance raises questions over R7,5bn in investment and sales not met to date, or that are unaccounted for. Government say the circulation is wrong. Whether this figure is right or wrong is almost irrelevant. What is relevant is that the report is inadequate and confusing.

It is, for example, not enough to indicate that BAE/Saab has only met 95% of its sales commitments. We want to know why this happened, and what government plans to do about this.

The report on arms contractor Thales states only that the company achieved 85% of its overall target. Does this mean Thales is ahead or behind on its commitments? We don't know.

The report scores points for raising concern that German company Ferrostaal might not make its targets. But it could hardly be denied. Business Day has carried speculation to this end for about a year. The report does not give any indication of just how far Ferrostaal is.

Last year's annual report on these matters was possibly worst than its latest version. The 2003 report claimed to be a detailed presentation of actual projects that had been facilitated. Despite this claim, the report listed several projects that were not in existence.

Accurate and detailed facts and figures in black and white will be a good start. Ultimately, however, it is the projects claimed to have been facilitated by arms contracts that could convince us of the offset programme's merits.

As such, government and arms contracts should allow every South African taxpayer and the media access to information on these.

With acknowledgement to the Business Day.