Publication: Business Day Issued: Date: 2001-02-13 Reporter: Stephen Laufer

With Friends or Foe, Every Country Needs an Army

 

Publication 

Business Day
Date 2001-02-13

Reporter

 Stephen Laufer

Web Link

www.businessday.co.za

 

Experience should teach us not to underestimate region's forces, writes Stephen Laufer

It's time to get back to basics on the arms deal. Threatening to get lost in controversy is the fact that SA needs a modem military capability, whatever the substance of allegations of corruption, offset overstatements and other malfeasance.

Remember the Botswana Defence Force's (BDF's) armoured car breakdown during the Lesotho intervention two years ago? Or, a decade earlier, the SA Air Force's startled discovery in the skies over Angola of advanced MiG fighters it assumed were limited to Europe?

As Angolan jets flew rings around the SAAF, Armscor scrambled to procure missile technology to put Pretoria back in the fight. As Maseru burned and SA troops battled to restore stability, BDF mechanics laboured to get their vehicles out of Mafikeng.

In September 1998 the BDF breakdown was an embarrassment. Next time, it could mean defeat - particularly tragic if the international mandate is peace.

What the Southern African Development Community intervention taught was not to underestimate the region's armies. SA's casualties in Lesotho also resulted from arrogance - the belief that 600 SA National Defence Force troops could restore stability because the other side would not fight. It is an arrogance shared by those who believe current SANDF equipment levels are so superior they can dominate any peace or stability mission in the region.

If restoring order in Lesotho with minimal casualties required a much bigger show of force, what might it take when those planning a coup or destabilising the region have years of battle experience in Mozambique, Angola or the Democratic Republic of Congo?

Hold on. We are a peaceful nation with friends everywhere. Combat readiness was the issue in the past. But how can it be today? Besides, nobody really questions the need for new jets, helicopters, submarines *2 and corvettes.

Or do they? The critics just want to be sure the acquisition process was free of shakedowns, that the trade and investment offsets will flourish, and that SA's balance of payments will emerge unscathed. So they say.

Sceptics sense more than meets the eye. A lingering pacifism *3 perhaps, which, deep down, really does believe this is about boats versus butter? Hawks versus housing? Or clean water, clinics, and schools instead of Gripens?

Whatever the protestations of those Ieading the charge on the corruption and countertrade front, the dividing line to condemning the whole acquisition is invisible to the broad public. That, arguably, is precisely what those opposed to the rearmament programme as a matter of principle want.

The hope is that criticism of aspects of the arms package will accumulate to become a questioning of the entire package *4.

Theirs is still a benign world in which nobody wishes SA any ill. A world in which the country's status as a regional power derives solely from its moral standing, never from an ability to project power in the interests of real politik, regional peace, and investor confidence.

So why is government so reticent about defending the package on strategic grounds? *5 Has anybody heard of the defence review lately? Does anybody remember its strategic analysis of SA's role in Africa -and the world, or its proposals, accepted by cabinet and Parliament, for a smaller, better equipped defence force?

Until Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota's recent press meetings, nothing was heard from the government on the subject since the days of Joe Modise and Ronnie Kasrils. An empty stage has allowed those keen to sow doubt one command performance after another *6.

Perhaps the reluctance to talk Turkey on defence is understandable. Or, more precisely, Zimbabwe, Congo, Angola, or the world's powers.

Why alarm skittish neighbours by publicly discussing air superiority as a key factor in diplomatic leverage when regional stability is at stake? Why remind those with harbours that submarines are the cheapest way to prevent gun runners entering port because they are invisible and smugglers don't know where they are?

Why draw attention to the vulnerability to naval blockade of SA's export-import gateway, Durban?

The US, German, French, British, Indian and other navies which have exercised there in recent years know what they would do if push came to shove. So why rub their political masters' noses in it while we are still all good friends?

Better to discuss strategies for peace interventions, weapons interdiction, or national defence behind closed doors. Keep a low profile while gradually facing up to the fact in public that we are the big guys on the block with the responsibilities for stability that implies.

In the meantime, the package's other strategic messages have reached their intended recipients. The Germans know a large order for ships and submarines is also about ensuring their long-term political and industrial engagement.

Same for the UK Sweden and Italy whose aircraft contracts create links and obligations which will be of mutual long-term benefit.

And France and the US?, They initially got nothing, a knuckle rap for breaching the arms embargo against apartheid and for playing hardball with the new SA's Armscor. But keeping them out and angry is not in SA's long-term interest. So France's Thomson-CSF got the lucrative subcontract for the corvette combat suites. And Boeing sold its 737-800s to SAA. A suitably civilian deal.

Corruption there may have been *7, though no hard evidence has yet seen the light of day *8. Problems there may be with some of the offsets, though it is early days yet for judging whether promises made will be kept. Dealing with.the currency challenges inherent in a deal of this magnitude may show what deal-making skill *9 was present and what lacking when the contracts were signed.

In May 1997 Mobutu Sese Seko was driven up ramp of the navy's biggest ship for talks with Laurent Kabila, who landed on its helicopter deck.

All of this in Pointre Noire, Republic of Congo. The talks which ensured a peaceful transition in Zaire took place on an African ship. The regional power had contributed to an African solution to an African problem.

Looking around today, it seems likely it may have to do so again. The government should explain this to the people more forcefully and more frequently *10.

With acknowledgements to Stephen Laufer and Business Day.


*1       So the SAAF embarked on the Cheetah fighter programme, resulting in 38 effectively brand new Cheetah C frontline jet fighters being taken into service by SAAF's 2 Squadron.


*2      Everybody should question the need for new jet fighters and submarines.


*3      Few South Africans have a lingering pacifism, but nearly all have knowledge of lingering corruption involving the acquisition of weapons of war.


*4      The entire set of packages is questionable because every single package is tainted by corruption, yes even the helicopter deal.


*5      The answer is because the Arms Deal is the hottest of hot potatoes. Every item of equipment can be challenged in terms of need, selection, there are serious questions about price, serious questions about functionality deficiencies now being acquired as extra items and every item is subject to regularity questions, conflicts of interest and straight up and down corruption.

It's a public relations nightmare for both government and the suppliers.

That's why the author of this article is now acting as spokesman for Saab and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems because it is too sensitive a matter to handle inhouse.


*6      We take a bow - thank you.


*7      Corruption there was - it's a legal fact - only in a couple of proven instances so far, but many more to come.


*8      Premature words, Mr Laufer, but this was written at the very commencement of the JIT's investigation.

But since then there have been delectable items of evidence that have seen the light of day: just two of these being The Encrypted French Fax and The Teutonic Internal Memorandum.


*9      There was clearly very little legitimate deal-making skill present during the contract negotiation process because just about every acquisition is questionable in respect of regularity and criminality.

However, where huge skill was shown by the government was closing out the local investigation into these aspects of regularity and criminality.


*10     Will they be doing this themselves or through the good offices of outsourced public relations professionals such as the author?

But remember the immortal words of Chief of Acquisitions, Shamin Shaik, during a brief to the prospective supplier in early 1999 :
"We, the government, do not care if the equipment we are purchasing works or not, we are only interested in the industrial offsets.
If the systems can actually fire a missile, this will be the cherry on the top.
If we have to buy the corvettes without engines and tow them to Simon's Town, then we will do so".

This has been repeated as evidence under oath and not challenged under cross-examination, even though both Shaik and his legal representative were present during the evidence and took part in the cross-examination.

It is the truth.