Smoke and mirrors |
Publication |
Mail and Guardian |
Date | 2009-05-01 |
Reporter | Ivor Powell |
Web Link | www.mg.co.za |
Two years is a long time in a wilderness of mirrors.
I’ve kept faith with my former bosses in the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA)
and what I hope was a dignified silence in
the face of misrepresentations for almost exactly two years now, since May 7
2007.
I kept my trap shut and I watched, sometimes with amusement, frequently with
frank disbelief, as my whole life was turned inside out in distorted reflections
and echoes.
More and more evidence piled up of systematic invasions of my work as an
investigator for the directorate of special operations, more and more evidence
that I had been the target of undercover operations by agencies of state.
Why? I’m not criminal. I don’t work for a foreign intelligence service. I wasn’t
even an undercover asset of Thabo Mbeki’s presidency. The only answer I can find
is that I was trying to do my job and in particular one aspect of that job,
the now-notorious Browse Mole exercise.
The document has been characterised as an act of high treason, a rogue plot
orchestrated by third force elements, clear evidence of substance abuse, the
sinister meddling of foreign intelligence agencies ...
Then it turned out that I had been misled from the start and, worse, that I had
apparently been offered up as a scapegoat.
But I won’t keep quiet any longer. Here goes …
First, some stumps of fact that could snag the skeins of
deceit and disinformation.
Special Browse “Mole” was commissioned by the former head of the directorate of
special operations (Scorpions), Leonard McCarthy now vice-president
responsible for integrity at the World Bank in early 2006.
I was sole author, subject to two caveats: that McCarthy passed certain pieces
of (unsourced) information to me during my inquiry and he instructed that
certain passages, written by himself, be inserted into the text.
On May 7 2007 a copy of one version of the report I produced was
faxed anonymously *1 to Cosatu general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi. On May
30 the National Security Council, at the behest of then president Thabo Mbeki,
appointed a task team to investigate the document’s sourcing and authorship, and
particularly the nature of, and motivation behind, the leak.
The team headed by senior National Intelligence Agency (NIA) official Arthur
Fraser involved the NIA, police and South African Secret Service.
Dovetailing with this, the SACP requested an inquiry by Parliament’s joint
standing committee on intelligence. The report of the Fraser investigation was
duly passed on to it, forming the basis of a committee report made public early
last year.
The parliamentary committee found the contents of the document “extremely
inciteful [sic] and provocative, containing, inter alia, numerous allegations
and unsubstantiated statements about prominent political figures in South Africa
and the African continent.
“In essence, the document begins with a conclusion that the former deputy
president Jacob Zuma was involved in a conspiracy which was a threat to the
sovereignty and integrity of the South African state.”
It also noted that “the task team has demonstrated that the leaked document
originated from the senior special investigator, Mr Ivor Powell, and thereafter
found its way to the public through the peddlers and the media”.
This was one of several mentions of “Mr Ivor Powell”. Curiously, neither the
Fraser team nor the committee saw fit to speak to Powell before reaching their
conclusions. Indeed, after the committee’s report was made public, I tried on
several occasions to contact its chairperson, Siyabonga Cwele (now intelligence
minister), leaving him voice messages in which I communicated my willingness
even eagerness to assist with any queries. I briefed lawyers to write letters
to this effect.
To no avail. Nobody seemed to give a tinker’s
for what I had to say.
How did the document get its funny name Special Browse “Mole”? “Mole” is an
arbitrary codename the result, no doubt, of my reading of too many spy novels
in my impressionable youth. “Browse”, however, has significance. McCarthy
indicated that the inquiry should be so designated, following (he explained) the
practice of the United States intelligence services.
What distinguishes a browse from other, more colourful species of intelligence
practice the “black op” for example, interception and monitoring projects,
undercover operations, honey traps or anything else you might read about in a
John Le Carré novel *3 is the following:
no invasive techniques or technologies and no slush funding are used, no agents
are directed or undercover operations set up, there is no infiltration or
penetration of target networks and no subterfuge or coercion in collecting
material.
A browse is an informal and open-source exercise,
a collection of information already in the public domain or at most the
semi-public domain, as the rules of the game allow one to talk to sources on a
confidential and voluntary basis.
You, the browser, then sift it all and try to make sense of it. At the end of
the day, you make recommendations in respect of follow-ups by empowered
investigators.
The resources at your disposal are rather less than those available to the
average journalist or academic researcher. To talk about a browse as an
intelligence product is to misrepresent it regardless of the agency it
emanates from.
For me, Mole was an internal briefing and nothing
more *2. While the information McCarthy passed on to me may have been
sourced to private intelligence agencies, to my knowledge, no money was paid for
this, nor was information “peddled” in preparing the document.
Curiously, Mole’s contents have never been an
issue. And given the times, the commissioning was not difficult to
understand: Zuma’s supporters were growing increasingly militant and threatening
violence and mayhem in the face of what they characterised as a vicious campaign
of vilification against their leader.
At the same time the campaign that finally brought Zuma to power at Polokwane
was building up a head of steam and evidencing lavish but unacknowledged
funding.
Against this backdrop, allegations were filtering through in the media that Zuma
received money from Libya’s Moammar Gadaffi to aid him in his struggle against
Mbeki and that before his death mining magnate Brett Kebble (himself under
intense NPA scrutiny) was bankrolling Zuma’s campaign.
Add the curious emergence of a white rightwinger, Jurg Prinsloo, as a
self-professed ally and driving force behind the “Office of Jacob Zuma” and you
get a mix that, unsurprisingly, sets off alarm bells in the NPA and probably
also the presidency. (One of the few supporters of the substance of the Browse
report was Mbeki himself.)
It is worth emphasising that the version of the Browse Mole leaked to the world
was the second of three reports the first was completed in March 2006, the
second (the leaked version) on July 12 2006 and the third was submitted to
McCarthy on September 22 2006.
Hereby hangs a tale. Regarding their investigations into the second version,
both the Fraser lot and the parliamentary committee noted that the NPA and
McCarthy had been less than forthcoming in helping their inquiries.
Instead of handing my computer and other items to Fraser’s investigators, the
NPA briefed the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) to perform its own forensic
investigations. McCarthy was also at some pains to maintain a buffer between the
investigators and me, insisting that all dealings should be conducted with
himself as intermediary.
I subsequently discovered that he also understood his role to embrace both
selective editing and rewriting of history. On the editing front, he omitted all
mention of a third report (incidentally supplemented by at least one additional
note sent to his encrypted fax by arrangement as late as October 2006).
Also read Browsed and beaten.
With acknowledgements to
Ivor Powell and Mail and Guardian.