Dear Reader:
Zuma before the court of public opinion
Publication
Noseweek
Issue 112
Date
2009-02-01
Reporter
Editor
Had Mr Zuma been a private citizen, the public might have
presumed his innocence and patiently awaited the outcome of his trial, as and
when it takes place. But he is not just a private citizen. He is seeking the
highest public office in the land and, for that reason, his trial in the court
of public opinion is already in full swing.
It has become common to speak of Jacob Zuma as having sought "only" a R500 000
annual bribe from the French arms company Thales (formerly Thompson CSF
[sic - Thomson-CSF]).
That isn't all, of course, but let’s just for the purpose of this argument
concede that a R500 000 bribe is, in relation to the amounts flowing in the arms
deal, but small cheese – hardly worth mentioning, let alone prosecuting him for.
Especially since, so that argument goes, he didn’t swing the corrupt arms deal
as such, but merely helped out with a bit of after-the-event cover-up.
The trouble is that when people talk like that they, for starters, have
forgotten all about Zuma’s “generally corrupt relationship” with Schabir Shaik.
When Schabir was charged, tried and sentenced, the prosecutors were only able to
prove a total of R1,2m that Shaik had paid to a public office-bearer – one Jacob
Zuma – to secure his favour and influence in advancing Shaik’s general business
interests. Like helping Shaik secure a stake in the proposed Durban Point
waterfront development and Hilton Hotel, or in a major tourism project that was
to have been launched by Scottish investor Professor John Lennon; the extremely
lucrative contract to produce the country's "credit card" drivers' licences,
Schabir Shaik collected a hefty prison sentence on that score alone. His
conviction and sentence were confirmed by both the appeal court and the
constitutional court.
Logically, of course, the identical case holds against Zuma, the other half of
the same “generally corrupt” relationship – except that since the Shaik trial
the Scorpions have unearthed documentation to show that, in fact, Shaik had over
the years paid Zuma not just R1,2m, but more than R4m, to advance their sweet
but generally corrupt relationship. Shaik did try pleading that these payments
were part of a “revolving loan” agreement he had with Zuma. The trouble was that
it never revolved: Zuma never paid interest, or even a cent in capital. And they
could not produce a signed agreement. None of the judges believed them.
Unless Zuma is able successfully to plead
insanity or mental retardation, on these charges alone the
odds are 1 000-to-one he’s a goner. All the prosecution has to do is play it
again Sam.
That settled, let’s take another look at his role in the arms deal. There,
closer examination reveals a lot, lot more than we had originally imagined. By
no means was he the poor Zulu waiter left to collect the
after-party dregs! Our man,
it transpires, had already, early on, elbowed his way onto
the main table. Come to
think of it, with his friend Schabir Shaik as his moneymate, it would have been
extremely odd if he hadn’t been. The Shaik brothers were running it, with
brother Chippy the official producer-director of the entire arms deal show.
(Which explains why he is now living in Australia, whose courts don’t generally
favour extradition to South Africa.)
In 1992 – yes, the arms dealers were then already closing in – Schabir Shaik and
Thomson (“The French”) drafted a memorandum of understanding according to which
all Thomson’s interests in South Africa were to be held and controlled through a
new company called Nkobi Holdings, in which the Shaiks, the French and the ANC
(or a faction of it) would be shareholders. Contemporaneous notes made by Shaik
suggest that, even at that point, the plan was to have Zuma as a
ghost or “occult” stakeholder,
entitling him to a percentage of the profits.
When, however, soon thereafter, the French got warnings from people close to
Nelson Mandela (such as silk-shirt/arms-trader Yussuf Surtee) that the Shaiks’
Nkobi Holdings was not a “suitable” partner, Thomson CSF bought a stake in South
African arms company ADS, in preparation for its part of the arms deal – leaving
Nkobi and the Shaiks out in the cold.
Documents that have since come to light suggest that the French had been
encouraged by parties close to Mandela and his then deputy, Thabo Mbeki, to
rather do a deal with another ANC outfit,
led by Reuel Khoza, called Consolidated Network Investments (CNI).
In fact, things were going really badly for the Nkobi crowd – until Zuma
actively intervened on their behalf.
On about 3 July 1998 Zuma met Jean-Paul Perrier of Thomson in London, and
persuaded the French to consider restructuring their holding of ADS – giving
Nkobi its promised share. They clearly took him seriously: On the same day they
sought a meeting with Chippy Shaik, the official arms deal co-ordinator. At
their subsequent two-hour meeting, held a week later, Chippy stated that if
Thomson’s partners and friends suited him, he would make things easier, and, if
not, he would make things difficult. He also informed them that, within a year,
Jacob Zuma would be a member of the South African cabinet.
The French could take a hint. Three weeks later they were in Durban negotiating
with Schabir. Zuma popped in at the
meeting, just for a cup of tea.
That, take note, was more than a year
before the arms deal was signed.
Zuma’s role gets poignant play in a vignette offered by Schabir Shaik’s former
assistant, Bianca Singh, in her court evidence. In her recollection, it must
have been late in 1998 when her boss, Schabir, received a telephone call from
his brother, defence procurement co-ordinator Chippy Shaik. She recalled Schabir
assuring Chippy: “No, don’t worry. Not to worry.” Immediately thereafter Schabir
had telephoned Jacob Zuma – she knew it was him, because Schabir said “Hello my
brother! Hi JZ!”. Schabir, according to Singh, had then told Zuma: “Chippy is
under pressure and we really need your help to land this deal.”
There was, she declared, only one deal they could have been talking about: the
arms deal. That “problem”, too, was sorted out.
A year later Schabir was writing to the French about “our understanding, Re:
Deputy President Jacob Zuma and issues raised”.
So JZ was using his political leverage to gain some profitable access to the
arms deal before it was concluded, and later he was involved in the cover-up for
a small consideration.
But, as the late night TV ad says, There’s more!
The deal struck with the French on Zuma’s behalf, according to one of their now
notorious encrypted faxes, entailed his receiving R500 000 per year until the
ADS’s dividends began to flow. The fax, sent by Thomson’s then “delegate” in SA,
to his head office in Paris (with a copy to the chairman of Thomson
International), also sets out what they expected from Mr Zuma in return.
“May I remind you,” says the delegate, “that the two main objectives of the
‘effort’ requested of Thomson are: Protection of Thomson CSF during the current
investigations (Citron), [and] permanent support of JZ for the future projects.”
Future projects? Yes, dear reader, Thomson, now Thales and/or Thint, are indeed,
right now, lined up for yet more lucrative deals with the SA Defence Force,
presumably with Zuma’s support. This time it’s a R2,2bn order from the army for
short-range missiles. Please note: no
tender was required.
Back in 1994 the ANC might have been a
simpering virgin being led
to the dance floor by arms dealers. But the South African dame now floating
comfortably in the European arms dealers’ embrace is
undoubtedly an old whore.
The fact that Jacob Zuma thinks he doesn’t have to explain and come clean with
the public on these matters before asking us for his vote is sufficient warning
of serious trouble in the making.
Southern Africa already has one
psychopathic, sometimes charming, president – do we need
another?
It would be well that Zuma’s madly enthusiastic supporters take note of the vast
numbers of Zimbabweans desperately seeking food and shelter in South Africa.
When it is our turn, where do we take the bus to help, or walk a thousand miles
to a bite to eat? Ah, yes, sorry – there is the ferry. To Robben Island.
They should also note that, when we pass judgment on Zuma, we will also pass
judgment on the party that saw fit to elect him as its leader.
Don’t wait until tomorrow. Get out there and join – and actively support, with
muscle and money – the opposition party of your choice.
The odds are bigger than we’d like them to be, but change is possible. Ask Barak
Obama.
The Editor
With acknowledgements to
Noseweek.
The three phases of corruption: before,
during and after the deal done by means of the Encrypted Fax.