Feature: South Africa’s Strategic Options |
Publication |
defenceWeb |
Date | 2012-10-10 |
Reporter | Helmoed Römer Heitman |
Web Link | http://www.defenceweb.co.za |
South Africa faces a number of defence and
security challenge and consequently needs to
develop forces that provide a useful degree of
security against internal and external threats.
Defence analyst Helmoed Römer Heitman looks at
how South Africa needs to decide its place and
role in Africa and in relation to the
international community, and the way it must
then develop its foreign and defence policies
and structure its armed forces.
Challenges
Africa, and particularly Sub-Saharan
Africa, is both under-developed and
under-governed.
One result of this is a general inability to
provide security against irregular forces and
even criminal groups. The well-known issue of
Somalia-based piracy is just one example: Other
security challenges include piracy in West
African waters; large-scale armed banditry in
the Sahel; guerrilla and militia groups in the
Sahel, West and Central Africa; the expansion of
Islamist extremist groups in the Sahel and to
its south; and the expansion of South American
narcotics groups in West Africa and of Asian
narcotics groups in East Africa.
A further result is that Sub-Saharan Africa is
the only region of the world in which new major
powers will be able to contest with each other
without incurring serious economic, military or
political risk. This will not be to the benefit
of Africa, but cannot be prevented or even
contained in the absence of credible African
armed forces.
There is also a real interest in Africa by the
major powers, and particularly the new major
powers for its resources, as a source of votes
in international bodies, as a collection of
potential client states, and as a market for
shoddy goods that cannot be sold anywhere else.
If Africa does not get its house in order it
will be raped.
Some sterling efforts have been made to address
the overall challenge, most notably the
initiatives that became MAP and then NEPAD and,
still to come to fruition, the concept of the
African Standby Force.
But there is still too much dissonance within
Africa, too ready a willingness to believe in
fairy tales and long out of date propaganda, and
too little willingness to think seriously about
defence and security.
There is a real and urgent need for some
introspection. As things stand, Africa presents
a wonderful example of battered wife syndrome:
First came the Arab slave raiders, then the
European colonial powers, then the Super Powers
during the Cold War, and now the new major
powers, not least the Chinese. All offer
blandishments, none are honest, and none mean
well by Africa.
One partial exception may be Europe – because
Africa is next door and Europe needs a stable
and prosperous neighbour.
The others really do not care much; they are
doing what they believe is in the best interests
of their countries, and that will not often
coincide with the best interests of Africa: The
USA wants secure access to oil and to other
resources, and to keep China and al Qaeda out;
Brazil wants client states and markets; India
wants client states, markets, access to oil and
other resources and farming land; China wants
client states, markets for goods it cannot sell
elsewhere, access to resources, farming land
and, if one is to believe some Chinese
officials, a place for surplus Chinese peasants.
The Middle East powers want farming land.
They will compete in Africa and over Africa’s
resources, and they will use military force if
they have to – albeit mainly in the form of
proxy forces provided by client groups and
client states in Africa. It is the same old
power game that states play, only with some new
actors.
While Africa cannot even ensure its own internal
and inter-state security and stability, it
presents an open invitation to others to use it
as a playground.
One of the fundamental challenges, therefore,
will be to develop the forces that can provide
at least a useful degree of security - against
criminal groups, against irregular forces,
against terrorists, and against military
adventures by African governments that might
turn rogue, thereby removing some of the
potential excuses for military or semi-military
intervention by outside powers.
That is going to be difficult to do, given
decades of neglect, poor choices and a general
lack of funds coupled with other real and urgent
demands on governments. The donor nations will
not be of much help here; few are willing to
even consider security or defence aid, because
African states are ‘not democratic enough’.
The problem is that democracy is going to be
difficult to develop and settle in the absence
of both prosperity and security, and prosperity
is going to be impossible to achieve without
security.
Back, therefore, to the challenge of providing
for our security and defence. Africa is going to
have to largely do that for itself. That will
require sacrifice, giving up politically
attractive social programmes to free up the
necessary funds.
Where NATO and the Warsaw Pact once relied on
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) to keep their
peace, Africa needs to look to Mutual,
Interdependent Defence and Security (MIDAS),
which might in time actually see the future turn
to gold.
Once Africa can really demonstrate a willingness
and ability to work together in a focused way,
at least at regional level, those major powers
who mean well by us will prove willing to help.
But first must come the ‘own bootstraps’ phase.
South Africa must, in its own self-interest,
take an active part in all of this.
We have the largest economy in Africa; we have
one of the top 30 economies in the world and are
among the top 20 trading nations and the top 12
maritime trading nations, and we have the only
industrialised economy in Africa. That all
sounds wonderful, but it actually means that
South Africa is heavily dependent on Sub-Saharan
Africa stabilising and prospering; we need a
stable environment in which to grow our own
economy.
Also, we need to have a voice in international
affairs, and that demands that we pay our dues
as members of the international community. One
element of ‘paying our dues’ is to help
stabilise our own region.
It is against this background that South Africa
must consider its strategic options for the
future.
The Strategic Options
South Africa must decide its place and
role in Africa and in relation to the
international community, and must then develop
its foreign and defence policies and structure
its armed forces accordingly.
The current parlous situation of the Defence
Force results largely from a gross mismatch
among the Defence White Paper and Defence Review
of 1996 and 1998, the force design developed
from them and the actual force commitments
entered into on the other. This has led to gross
operational over-stretch of the Army, of the
Navy’s surface forces, and of the Air Force’s
transport capacity.
Added to that has been gross under-funding of
the Defence Force generally, which has added to
the damage, and also brought the loss of, or
failure to develop, capabilities that will soon
prove to be essential, airlift and sealift among
them.
The lack of funding has also resulted in the
decline of our defence industry to a level at
which it is on the verge of fading away
altogether. That presents the risk of becoming
entirely dependent on the goodwill of major
powers for equipment, systems integration and
support, as well as the loss of the ability to
develop equipment optimised for our needs and
the Defence Force’s operational style.
And, of course, we must cease considering
party-political affiliation, race or gender as
determining factors in deciding senior
appointments and promotions. To continue to do
so is to insult all of the competent members of
the Defence Force, and especially the majority
of perfectly competent black members who do not
need special favours to rise through the ranks
and who resent being regarded as needing those
favours.
South Africa must urgently decide what role it
wants to play, and what the role of its Defence
Force is to be; and then we must focus urgently
on rebuilding the Defence Force to meet the
challenges it will face over the coming decades.
There are essentially eight possible roles South
Africa could choose to play, although only a few
are practicable:
International Power
That is to say a power that plays a
political and when necessary also a military
role over much of the globe. This is not within
the realm of the practicable. South Africa lacks
the economic strength, the industrial base and
the population.
Super-Regional Power
That is to say a power that plays a
political and when necessary also a military
role over the wider African, South Atlantic and
Indian Ocean region. This is also not
practicable, for the same reasons as above.
Continental Power
This might theoretically be possible, but
not at our current economic strength, and not
while the countries north of the Sahara are more
focused on Europe than on Africa and regard
Sub-Saharan Africa as an unwelcome appendage.
Regional Power
South Africa could aspire to being the
regional power of Sub-Saharan Africa. It has the
economic strength and the industrial base to
achieve and sustain that status. But that would
require massive investment in the Defence Force,
in building allied forces, and in the diplomatic
efforts to develop and maintain this status. It
would also risk alienating the major
sub-regional actors such as Nigeria, Ethiopia
and Kenya.
Regional Power in Partnership
A more logical route for South Africa to
follow would be to establish itself as a joint
regional power with the key sub-regional actors.
That would ensure that the key country of a
sub-region would be the lead-nation, drawing on
its better regional understanding and
intelligence, with South Africa free to focus on
providing those capabilities that others in the
particular sub-region cannot, and on its role as
sub-regional power in Southern Africa.
Sub-Regional Power
The role of sub-regional power, ie the major
power in Southern Africa is practicable,
affordable, and not avoidable if South Africa
wants to have a real influence on its immediate
environment and at least a degree of influence
in the adjoining sub-regions.
Isolationist Power
The role of isolationist power would assume
keeping out of regional affairs but taking
autonomous measures when interests in Africa are
threatened. That would require armed forces of
considerable strength and would bring the
challenge of other African powers seeing South
Africa as a threat.
Isolationist State
The ‘ostrich model’ is, naturally, the
cheapest in terms of investment in the armed
forces and, for that matter, in foreign
relations. It would also, however, mean
foregoing any ability to influence events in our
immediate region, and would also mean not being
taken seriously in international organisations
and forums.
Even Germany and Japan have found that they can
no longer dodge their regional and international
obligations as major economic powers, and the
recent failure of Europe to deal effectively
with Libya has underlined how important military
capability is to overall national capacity to
exert influence in important matters, and to
national image in the eyes of other nations.
The Choice
Practical realities suggest South Africa
should choose between being a regional power in
partnership or a sub-regional power.
Given the extent to which the Defence Force has
been allowed to run down, the former is probably
not truly practicable in the near term or even
fully attainable over the medium term.
South Africa should, therefore, focus for the
time being on the demands of being a
sub-regional power, while also developing links
with the other sub-regional powers of the
continent with an eye to co-operation and later
co-ordination and collaboration as a regional
power in partnership.
Becoming a sub-regional power will require
rejuvenation of the Defence Force, some
re-equipment and the development of additional
capabilities, particularly in respect of force
projection. It will also require a concerted
effort to develop a coherent and complementary
set of military capabilities in the region so
that South Africa need not bear the entire
burden.
The Military Implications
The military implications of being a
sub-regional power lie mainly in the areas of
foreign and defence policy and alliances, and in
the need to develop and sustain adequate force
projection capability.
That does not, of course, remove the need to
develop and retain a basic self-defence
capability and the ability to protect national
borders and take on other tasks as assigned by
government.
Deterrence and Defence
The basic functions of the Defence Force
must remain those of deterring or defeating
aggression and conducting operations to protect
vital national interests.
Deterrence
South Africa can, clearly, not ‘deter’
aggression by any outside power with the
strength to deploy a serious military force into
the region, but it can develop a level of
‘deterrence’ that will discourage any such
adventure by a major power and deter lesser
aggressors.
The most cost-effective way to achieve that,
will be to develop and maintain a ‘deterrent
triad’ that comprises three core elements:
•A ‘Threshold Deterrent’ capability, in the form
of mechanised conventional warfare forces and
tactical air power at a strength that would
demand the commitment of substantial forces for
aggression to succeed, thereby making aggression
politically and logistically costly.
•A ‘Denial of Entry’ capability, in the form of
a submarine force and special forces elements of
sufficient strength and capability to make the
deployment of strong forces into the region by
sea – the only practicable means for an outside
power to do so – highly risky.
•A ‘Denial of Manoeuvre’ capability, in the form
of fighter and attack helicopter forces and
special forces elements of sufficient strength
and capability to make it impossible for
opposing forces to conduct the manoeuvre
operations demanded by the low force densities
and great distances of the sub-region, thereby
making aggression unlikely to achieve its aim.
To some extent, this ‘deterrent triad’ can also
be developed to provide a ‘deterrent umbrella’
for our immediate neighbours, although that
would require expansion of the fighter and
submarine forces.
Any intention to extend a ‘deterrent umbrella’
further afield will require commensurate
expansion of general military capability,
particularly airlift and sealift, beyond that
required for crisis response and peace support
missions.
It is worth making a point here: While there is
no imminent threat of conventional attack or
even of conventional war in the immediate
region, major threats can emerge and major
conflicts break out far more quickly than
effective armed forces can be developed.
Developing an effective defence force out of one
that has been badly neglected over decades is a
thirty year process. No one can guarantee thirty
years of peace; especially in an era in which
new major powers are competing for influence.
Protection of Vital Interests
The protection of vital national interests
will require the development and maintenance of:
•Joint rapid response force elements to protect
vital national assets outside South Africa’s own
territory, such as the Highlands Water Scheme in
Lesotho, the Cahora Bassa power station and
power lines in Mozambique, and the natural gas
fields of Mozambique and Namibia.
•Joint rapid deployment force elements that can
be deployed to aid a friendly government that is
faced with a sudden security threat and requests
assistance.
•Maritime forces – mainly frigates, patrol
vessels and patrol aircraft – able to protect
shipping through the Mozambique Channel and
along the west coast of Africa. It may in the
future also become necessary to protect tankers
en route from the Persian Gulf to African
waters.
National Security
The Defence Force must also be able to
perform other functions assigned to it by
government, with some of those functions being:
•Border Protection, which will require
substantial infantry forces with air support and
the naval and maritime air patrol assets to
monitor and protect our coastline and EEZ.
•National Key Point Protection, which will
require specialised units including reaction
units.
•Cyber Defence, which will require an expansion
of the Defence Forces secure communications
organisation to take on this additional task for
government.
•Police Support Operations, which can be handled
as a collateral function, employing existing
force elements as required.
•Domestic Emergency and Disaster Relief, which
can also be handled as a collateral function.
Support to Foreign Policy
The Defence Force must also be able to
support South Africa’s foreign policy. This will
include:
•The deployment of force elements for
international and regional peace support,
stabilisation and constabulary operations.
•The deployment of force elements to conduct
autonomous operations when it is in South
Africa’s interest to do so.
•Support for defence alliances, for instance by
assisting other countries with training in time
of peace and being able to deploy to their
assistance in time of crisis.
•Development of defence industrial alliances, to
advance inter-operability among the regional
armed forces.
Some such operations may require conventional
forces, as is amply demonstrated by the African
Union operations in Somalia, and by the
availability of armoured vehicles, artillery and
even tanks to some other irregular forces.
Force Design Priorities
The first priority must be to maintain
key existing defence capabilities, the second to
address the challenge of operational
over-stretch, after which thought can be given
to capability optimisation and then longer-term
force design, development and maintenance.
The overall longer-term aim should be to develop
a continuous force optimisation/capability
maintenance cycle, which should use either
continuous low-rate re-equipment or
half-generation replacement of equipment to
avoid the military and financial challenges of
block obsolescence.
Capability Maintenance
The most urgent matters to be addressed are:
•Funding adequate training at individual
soldier, unit and combat group level, followed
by the training of at least one brigade to full
operational standard. The Army is not currently
capable of deploying a brigade in the face of
any serious opposition, and all reports suggest
that all training is badly under-funded, from
the marksmanship training of the individual, to
the proper field training of units. Also, all
services are critically short of technical
personnel.
•Retention of the fighter force: If funding is
not found immediately to increase flying hours
at 2 Squadron and 85 Combat Flying School to at
least 140 hours per pilot per year, with a
realistic prospect of reaching at least 180
hours over the near term, the fighter force will
become ineffective because the pilots will lack
the necessary skills and experience. Many of the
pilots will also leave the Air Force. The
fighter force will then close itself down, and
it will take 20-30 years to recreate that
capability.
•Rejuvenation of the Mechanised Infantry force:
The Ratel is no longer effective as an infantry
combat vehicle, both in terms of its design and
in terms of the age of the vehicles. Failure to
do replace it now will place the mechanised
infantry at risk should they be deployed for
peace enforcement or similar operations in which
they may well encounter more effective vehicles.
It will also leave the Army facing a much
costlier project, probably very much later.
They must be addressed now, because there is not
much time for an effective intervention before
the situation results in long-term damage.
Both the fighter force and the mechanised
infantry will be key elements of any realistic
force design for the Defence Force of the medium
and long-term future:
•Fighters are essential:
- For the control of our airspace.
- To ensure our ground forces freedom to
manoeuvre in a theatre of low force densities,
great distances and few roads.
- To deny opposing forces the use of air space
and the freedom to manoeuvre.
•The mechanised infantry is the single most
generally useable force component of the Army,
as well suited to conventional warfare
operations as to ‘operations other than war’,
such as the various forms of peace support
operations. Its infantry combat vehicles can
perform all of the functions of an armoured
personnel carrier and many of the functions of
an armoured car or combat reconnaissance
vehicle. The ICV is the most all-round useful
vehicle in an army.
Taking immediate steps to ensure the survival of
these two force components will not, therefore,
in any way compromise the freedom to develop a
new force design.
Addressing Overstretch
The next most urgent requirement is to
address the problem of operational over-stretch,
which has badly damaged the Army in particular.
The Defence Force needs the personnel strength,
the structure and the equipment to be able to
stay the course in current peace support
commitments (Darfur, DRC), diplomatic
commitments (Central African Republic),
constabulary operations (Mozambique Channel) and
border protection (border and national waters,
including the EEZ), as well as potential
additional commitments (for instance the mooted
deployment of forces to South Sudan). If the
President is to be taken at his word, the
Defence Force must also prepare for additional
commitments, for instance a deployment to Mali.
The Army needs to be given the funding and the
authority to take the necessary steps to match
its force structure to current and likely
deployment requirements, by:
•Forming new units or ‘2nd Battalions’ of
existing units, to allow a safe rotation cycle
that will provide the forces for deployment
without damaging the training programme or
undermining the family life and morale of
personnel.
•Expanding its personnel strength to fully staff
all units required for such operations, to
ensure that cohesive units can in future be
deployed as such, instead of units that are
cobbled together from elements of many different
units.
•Adapting its personnel system, including
adoption of an optimised short-service system,
to allow an effective and efficient cycle of
training and operational deployment.
- A carefully worked out and implemented unit
staffing and training system could, for
instance, allow external deployments on a 1 in 4
cycle rather than the typical 1 in 6, while
moving experienced personnel from units employed
for external missions to border protection could
allow that task to be handled on a 1 in 3 cycle;
conceivably even a 1 in 2 cycle if units in
training relieve border protection units as part
of their operational training.
•Acquiring:
- Light protected patrol vehicles and sensor
equipment for the border protection role, which
can be developed locally in very little time and
at low cost.
- Light armoured vehicles for its
rapid-deployment force, with sufficient vehicles
for at least the sea-landed battalion groups,
allowing them to serve in the follow-on force
role, filling the deployment gap between the
early entry force that is the first on the
ground in a crisis, and the forces intended for
stabilisation. Such vehicles can be developed in
South Africa in very little time and at
affordable cost, drawing on existing
technologies.
- Mine-resistant/ambush-protected (MRAP)
vehicles, to allow operations in theatres in
which roadside bombs and similar threats are
likely, this threat having arrived in Africa, as
demonstrated in Somalia and Uganda. Such
vehicles are readily available in South Africa.
- Deployable artillery, able to deliver
suppressive fire against weapons commonly used
by irregular forces to shell towns, airports and
bases, such as the 20 km range 122 mm artillery
rockets. A suitable 30 km range 105 mm gun and
ammunition are already in development in South
Africa.
Thought must also be given to near-term measures
to enable the Army to be effective in a
situation such as would arise, for instance, in
a conflict prevention deployment interspersed
between the forces of North and South Sudan,
both of which have large numbers of tanks. This
will require, among other measures, bringing
more Rooikat armoured cars and G-6 guns out of
storage and training up the requisite personnel.
The Air Force needs to be given the funding to:
•Acquire maritime patrol and surveillance
aircraft, and additional shipboard helicopters,
to enable it to effectively complement naval
anti-piracy and sea land control operations.
•Rejuvenate its light and medium transport
capability, especially with an eye to supporting
the Special Forces.
•Acquire precision weapons for the Rooivalk, to
enable it to engage heavy targets (such as tanks
in the east of the DRC) and lighter targets
(such as ‘technicals’) that need to be engaged
precisely to avoid casualties among civilians
and damage to surrounding buildings. With the
Mokopa missile fully qualified, this would not
be an extraordinarily expensive matter.
•Acquire precision air-to-ground weapons for the
Gripen and Hawk, as well as additional
air-to-air weapons.
•Acquire long-range/heavy-lift airlift
capability, to enable it to deploy a reinforced
parachute battalion group with supporting light
armour to anywhere south of the Equator within
48 hours, and to deploy forces further afield
with no, or no more than one, refuelling stop.
The starting point here could be sufficient
airlift to deploy a reinforced company group
within that timeframe, with follow-on forces
deployed within 96 hours.
•Acquire a sustained reconnaissance/surveillance
capability.
•Operate its systems at effective utilisation
rates.
The Navy needs to be given the funding to:
•Acquire sufficient offshore patrol vessels of
adequate size to be able to conduct effective
patrols of South Africa’s EEZ, assist other SADC
countries and complement the frigate in the
anti-piracy role.
•Acquire two additional frigates or large ocean
patrol vessels of similar general capability, to
enable it to maintain an effective presence in
the Mozambique Channel for extended periods.
•Acquire a second support ship, to make
sustained regional patrol operations
practicable.
•Acquire landing platforms, to enable it to
deploy a light mechanised battalion group or
similar force and supporting helicopters in a
single lift, and to support that force until
logistic support can be established.
•Operate its systems at effective utilisation
rates.
These steps must be accompanied by the
acquisition of the necessary command, control
and communications systems, and by the
rejuvenation of the logistic and technical
support system.
Capability Optimisation, Force Design and
Force Development
Once the Defence Force has been able to
initiate projects and programmes to enable it to
meet the demands of current and pending
commitments, it can look to long-term capability
optimisation as a first step, followed by
developing a forward-looking force design and
then initiating a suitable force development
programme. These interlinked processes should
address:
•The full development of a joint crisis
response/rapid deployment capability.
•The creation and equipping of force elements to
allow sustained simultaneous deployment of up to
one brigade group and two battalion groups,
which is the level currently envisaged by
elements of government, while still maintaining
a reserve for crisis response operations and
short term deployments.
•The development of expanded and enhanced
constabulary capability for border protection,
anti-piracy and similar operations.
•Modernising the conventional forces that form
the core ‘threshold deterrent’.
This overall process will be a thirty-year or
longer undertaking, and the details will change
as the strategic situation develops, national
policies are adapted and new technologies
mature. But it must be initiated now if South
Africa is to keep ahead of challenges instead
of, as several times before in its history,
having to scramble to catch up with reality.
Affordability
In closing, it is worth stressing that
South Africa can afford a Defence Force with the
capabilities that its regional responsibilities
and interests require.
What is needed is a coherent long-term view and
the courage to make the necessary investments.
The result will not only be improved national
and regional security, but also expanded
employment within the Defence Force and within
the defence industry, and the spread of
technologies and skilled workers throughout the
wider industry and economy.
Given that long-term view and courage, the
Defence Force that South Africa needs can be
built on a defence budget of around 2% of the
GDP, assuming that no sudden emergency requires
the process to be accelerated.
The longer South Africa dithers in a fairy world
delusion of ‘peace in our time’, the more sudden
will be the shock, the less will be the time
available to play catch-up, and the higher the
cost - in cash and perhaps also in lives lost
unnecessarily. That basic lesson has been taught
over and over again by history, and there is no
excuse for not heeding it.
#1 Conrad Thomas 2012-10-11 10:23
An excellent article, but we need to overlay our
local defence industry against the strategy of
being a sub-regional power and look at the
sustainability of maintaining a South African
defence industry capability. Seeing that the
likelihood of any other SSA state taking a
different strategic stance is extremely remote,
a good option for the local defence industry
would be to look into other sub-regional powers
in SSA to bolster its sustainability outlook.
#2 Richard Young 2012-10-12 08:55
Indeed an informative article. Hopefully it is a
summary of the latest draft of the Defence
Review.
Unfortunately, South Africa cannot currently
afford a Defence Force with the indicated
capabilities with the current leakage from the
fiscus caused by national and endemic
corruption.
There is simply no money, even for maintenance
and operation of current equipment and systems,
let alone two new frigates, a second naval
support vessel and (plural) helicopter landing
docks, maritime patrol aircraft and long range
strategic airlift.
Two challenges are required by government before
it can even think of implementing the Force
Design of the new Defence Review:
1) plug the fiscal leaks by more than 70%; and
2) motivate in the relevant constituencies the
increase of defence spending from 1,2% to 2,0%
of GDP.
It's a hard ask and currently those challenges
are not simply achievable.
But I live in hope.
Because, as Mr Heitman says, trouble is coming.
It will arrive within the next 25 years.
It should be clear from whence it cometh.
With acknowledgement to
Helmoed Römer Heitman and defenceWeb.
We need a military
messiah.