So farce, so good: Zuma and the arms deal |
Publication |
Daily Maverick |
Date | 2014-08-11 |
Reporter | |
Web link |
The arms deal
commission of
inquiry has
expectedly turned
into a farce. Staff
are resigning.
Information seems
non-existent. GREG
NICOLSON evaluates,
and sees it’s oh so
Zuma.
Given a global
platform to explain
the successes of the
ANC and his
government,
President Jacob Zuma
took his chance at
the National Press
Club in Washington
DC last week. He
boasted South
Africa’s fifth peace
democratic
elections, pointed
to the rise in
middle income
earners, and the
expansion of foreign
companies entering
South Africa.
Inflation’s been
tamed; the
Johannesburg Stock
Exchange has grown;
the National
Development Plan
strives to reduce
unemployment,
eradicate poverty
and achieve annual
growth of 5.4%.
It was an investment
pitch: South
Africa is a success
– invest in the
country and we’ll
see greater success
together. For
Zuma, every pitch is
vital to creating a
legacy to be proud
of. But back home,
the inquiry into the
arms deal, a
supporting actor in
most major political
scandals in the last
15 years and a
shrine to the
corruption that
prevents investment,
has followed the
expected narrative
and crumbled into a
farce.
While Zuma’s hardly
to blame for the
1999 deal, then
worth R30 billion
but estimated to
have now ballooned
to a cost of up to
R70 billion, it’s
highly symbolic of
what he should be
remembered for. He’s
the director on a
political stage,
playing to the
audience’s desires,
setting scenes of
apparent conflict,
development,
progression, but
taking us nowhere,
resolving nothing,
immersing us in a
screenplay that
reflects reality but
is in fact fiction,
and never letting us
escape.
The arms deal
commission was a
turning point, said
then-Minister of
Justice and
Constitutional
Development Jeff
Radebe in 2011. “The
establishment of
this commission and
the commencement of
its work represent a
watershed moment in
the history of
democratic South
Africa, in a quest
to rid our nation of
what has become an
albatross that must
now cease to blemish
the reputation of
our government and
the image of our
country.”
At the time, Zuma
appeared to pre-empt
a ruling from the
Constitutional Court
and finally gave the
country the
commission of
inquiry many had
been calling for.
The terms of
reference were
generally
celebrated,
though Pierre de Vos
noted it
wouldn’t look into
the bribe Schabir
Shaik solicited on
behalf of Zuma
because that was for
influencing a
potential inquiry,
post deal *1.
It would, however,
evaluate the deal’s
rationale, how the
equipment has been
used, whether arms
dealers created jobs
as promised, whether
there was “improper
influence” on the
decision makers, and
if so, whether
contracts should be
cancelled.
There’s nothing
particularly wrong
with the terms of
reference. Yet the
inquiry isn’t the
key that will unlock
the vault of
corruption and wipe
clean the lingering
stain on democracy
that still, through
a maze so
convoluted, has a
negative effect on
the performance of
state institutions.
Like almost every
investigation before
it, the inquiry
isn’t going to
uncover corruption
committed between
arms dealers,
middlemen and
politicians, as once
again we see the
alleged influence of
politics.
On Friday, Mail &
Guardian published
excerpts of a letter
from two advocates
who were working as
evidence leaders at
the inquiry until
they resigned two
weeks ago. Barry
Skinner and Carol
Sibiya lasted longer
than others, but
clearly couldn’t
take it anymore. “We
believe our
integrity is being
compromised by the
approach which the
commission appears
intent on adopting,”
they said in their
15-page resignation
letter. “The role of
evidence leaders has
been diminished to
the point where they
are serving little
purpose and are not
independent,” they
continued.
Skinner and Sibiya
said they were
denied vital
evidence and weren’t
invited to a meeting
with Richard Young,
who has doggedly
fought for
accountability over
the arms deal, or
given vital
information he
handed over. They
criticised fellow
evidence leader
Fanyana Mdumbe, for
presenting one-sided
evidence and
intimidating
witnesses, for
attacking Young and
distorting
information. Skinner
and Sibiya were also
critical of
Chairperson Willie
Seriti’s decision
not to allow a
leaked report from a
law firm that
allegedly shows
German submarine
provider Ferrostaal
paid R300 million in
bribes. Seriti, they
added, also kept
them from
cross-examining
witnesses.
The two advocates
should be applauded
for surviving this
long. Senior
investigator Mokgale
Norman Moabi
resigned in
January with claims
the commission had
two agendas, the
first of which was
gazetted, the second
a clandestine
operation reporting
to the president.
One of the three
commissioners,
Francis Legodi
resigned reportedly
unhappy with
Seriti’s leadership
and the covert
handling of
evidence. Principal
legal researcher
Kate Painting has
also
quit, citing a
second agenda and
culture of fear.
Evidence leader
Tayob Aboobaker also
resigned. The
commission has
denied there is any
type of second
agenda and dismissed
the claims of
Skinner and Sibiya
as a
misunderstanding.
Officially, it’s
continuing and on
track.
Unofficially, it’s a
mess. Obviously,
Zuma isn’t the man
directly in charge
of the inquiry and
beyond the updates
he receives and date
extensions, he
should be awaiting
the inquiry’s
report. But Radebe
was more than happy
to claim the
announcement of a
commission as a
“watershed moment”
in SA’s history,
enacted of course by
the Zuma government.
The moment,
though, isn’t going
to be the shedding
of the ugly
albatross, but
accepting it as a
part of history.
It’s questionable
how many people even
care about the arms
deal: it has had no
apparent effect on
the ANC’s election
results, happened at
a time when the
country was young
and may, some say,
be forgiven for
making mistakes, and
for most people is
of less importance
than the
bread-and-butter
issues of employment
and service
delivery. The
watershed moment is
more likely to be a
defeat, convincing
those that still
care that you can’t
do anything about
the arms deal, which
is more likely to be
legitimised by the
current inquiry than
delegitimised.
Zuma’s taken us on a
ride to nowhere.
Back where we
started, why the
hell would we want
to get back on the
boat? Political
schools could give
lessons on how to
bury the truth while
at the same time
doing the right
thing, giving
everyone what they
want and giving them
nothing at all.
But sadly, for Zuma,
it won’t help his
legacy. Suppressing
the spy tapes won’t
make his
government’s
economic response to
the financial crisis
look impressive.
Avoiding corruption
charges – arms
deal-related or
Nkandla-related –
won’t shine a light
on achievements in
service delivery.
Defeating claims of
corruption doesn’t
equal an
appreciation of the
infrastructure
rollout.
Because at some
point we’ll wake up
and realise it’s all
fiction. We’ve been
cast as both actor
and audience in a
play that ends in
keeping Zuma out of
jail and leaving him
with a legacy to be
proud of. But he
can’t have the two.
It’s likely he’ll
stay out of jail,
continuing to march
brilliantly through
SA politics
unscathed, and
that’s what we’ll
remember him for.
He’ll be remembered
as the guy who got
us again, and got
away with it; the
leader the country
survived to
flourish. DM
With acknowledgement to Greg Nicolson and Daily Maverick.
*1
Zuma was bribed by
the French company
Thomson-CSF into
order to protect it
from investigation
regarding Project
Sitron.
That means that the
cause was not after
the conclusion of
the contracts but
bewfore then.
In any case Zuma was
fully involved with
the shenanigans of
the corvette
acquisition even
meeting with
Thomson-CSF in
London and in Durban
regarding
shareholding in
Nkobi Holdings.
There is even a
document indicating
an indirect
shareholding by Zuma
in ADS through a
special purpose
vehicle, probably
Clanwest Investments
(Pty) Ltd (there is
actually a bunch of
possibilities).