Did Parliament really sign off on the arms deal? |
Publication |
Mail & Guardian |
Date | 2014-08-07 |
Reporter | Sarah Evans |
Web link | www.mg.co.za |
Expectations will be
high as ex-DA MP Raenette
Taljaard testifies on
whether the House was
undermined to ensure there
was no probe into the arms
deal.
That Parliament approved of
the arms deal is a line that
has been repeated over and
over by government witnesses
testifying at the Seriti
commission of inquiry into
the deal. But it is an
assertion that is disputed,
and that dispute might be
formally put to the
commission on Thursday in
Pretoria.
At the heart of this dispute
will be the testimony of
Raenette Taljaard, a former
parliamentarian for the
Democratic Alliance (DA),
who believes that Parliament
was systematically and
purposefully undermined to
ensure that government would
be exonerated by any probe
into the arms deal.
What remains is an
institution that, as
recently as 2000, was an
enthusiastic interrogator of
government spending, but is
now a mere rubber stamp for
Cabinet decisions, according
to the former MP.
Taljaard, who now teaches
public policy at the
University of Cape Town,
will testify before the
commission when it resumes
its public hearings on
Thursday, after a short
adjournment last week. Her
2012 book, Up in Arms:
Pursuing Accountability for
the Arms Deal in Parliament,
reads like an anatomy of how
to scupper an investigation.
Stunting of Parliament’s
oversight role
Taljaard’s experience of the
arms deal, viewed from the
opposition benches in
Parliament and retold in her
book, was that it dealt a
blow to its institutions.
“South Africa has been
damaged by the arms deal,”
Taljaard wrote. “Its
institutions have barely
survived the ferocity of the
consequent assault on the
values and ideals of our new
democracy.”
The second Parliament, whose
speaker was Frene Ginwala,
should have busied itself
with “carving out a clear
oversight role for
[itself]”. Instead, Taljaard
wrote that Ginwala occupied
herself with finding reasons
why Parliament’s role in
investigating allegations of
corruption in the arms deal
should be limited. “The
stunting of Parliament’s
oversight role, which
continues to plague the
institution to this day, is
all part of this legacy.”
In August 2000, auditor
general Shauket Fakie
released a report that found
many irregularities in the
deal and recommended an
investigation. The public
protector’s investigation
was about to begin. In
October 2000, Parliament’s
standing committee on public
accounts (Scopa) released
its now infamous 14th
report.
After conducting public
hearings into the arms deal
and interviewing key
decision-makers, Scopa
recommended a multiagency
probe that would deploy the
forensic and legal muscle of
the state’s various arms to
uncover the truth about the
allegations of bribery and
corruption.
Soon after presenting its
14th report to Parliament,
Scopa’s members in the ANC,
who included Andrew
Feinstein (now an outspoken
critic of the deal), were
reportedly reprimanded by
the ANC’s governance
committee for questioning
“the integrity of
government” in the Scopa
meetings.
Publicly, the government
gave its assurances that it
would co-operate with the
multiagency probe, but
former president Thabo Mbeki
controversially refused to
allowed Judge Willem Heath’s
Special Investigating Unit (SIU)
to join the probe, despite a
request from Heath to
investigate. The SIU has the
power to cancel flawed
government contracts.
Frivolous and vexatious –
or Kafkaesque?
By 2001, a “concerted
assault” by Cabinet was
under way, intended to
undermine the work of Scopa
and the auditor general,
according to Taljaard; a
series of events that she
termed “Kafkaesque”. The
Joint Investigation Team,
the multiagency
investigation, released its
report that year. But it had
been edited to exclude any
reference to wrongdoing by
government or Cabinet
ministers.
In her book, Taljaard writes
that she attempted to get
hold of the unedited draft
report by requesting a copy
from the auditor general. “I
wanted to see for myself the
extent of the alterations
that had been made. In
January 2002 he responded to
my request by stating that
it was ‘manifestly frivolous
and vexatious’.”
Richard Young, an arms deal
bidder who had lost, later
went to court to obtain the
draft report. It was
materially different to the
final version presented to
Parliament, which attributed
no blame to government.
In
1997,
two years before the deal
was signed, Pan Africanist
Congress MP Patricia De
Lille had tabled her
infamous dossier of
allegations in Parliament,
requesting a fully fledged
investigation.
De Lille gave evidence at
the Seriti commission on
July 24.
Taljaard’s resignations
unrelated to the ANC
Taljaard’s book makes it
clear that she resigned from
the DA first, and from
Parliament second, citing an
irretrievable breakdown in
her relationship with then
party leader Tony Leon.
She wrote of her
resignation: “Allow me to
clarify again: my reasons
for departing relate
primarily to the DA, key
personalities within it and
their respective roles, and
not to the ANC.”
But her critique of the arms
deal and its damage to
oversight mechanisms in
Parliament and government,
as well as allegations that
Cabinet unduly exerted
pressure on these
independent institutions to
protect ministers from
accountability, are sure to
emerge as strong themes in
her evidence on Thursday.
Sarah Evans is a Mail &
Guardian news reporter.
With acknowledgement to Sarah Evans and Mail and Guardian.
There
are two different aspects on
the question whether
Parliament really signed off
on the arms deal?
Firstly, did it approved the
acquisition.
The answer is no.
It approved the Defence
Review and possibly its
force design,
But it did not approve the
acquisition itself and its
spending.
It could not - the DoD
simply did not have the
money budgeted.
Modise said so.
Lt Gen Steyn as Secretary
for Defence advised him as
such as testified as such at
the APC.
Secondly, Parliament's SCOPA
got mutilated by the Arms
Deal and the Government's
all out assault on anything
anywhere to avoid its
fallout.
Such mutilation makes
hanging, drawing and
quartering look mild.
Because Parliament's and its
SCOPA's oversight role is no
more.
The Arms Deal killed South
Africa - at least in that
respect.
It effectively the SA Air
Force and SA Navy because,
by buying the wrong stuff
they cannot do their jobs.
The SAAF has had to mothball
Gripens fighter jets, Hawk
jet trainers and even Agusta
light utility helicopters -
because it has no funds to
operate and maintain them.
The SAN currently has only
one operationally-capable
frigate and one
operationally-capable
submarine - because it has
no funds to operate and
maintain them.
The SAN says at the Seriti
Commission that it needed
four frigates and three
attack submarines because
"to patrol is to control"
Yet instead of the 270 days
per year operational
availability (around 75%) it
has achieved about 18%
patrol availability since
acquisition after nearly ten
years.
And even that figure is
grossly misleading.
Most of that operational
time for the four frigates
is spent on Operation Copper
- patrolling north of
Mozambique and Madagascar on
anti-piracy patrol.
That is not within the SAN's
constitutional mandate -
which is to ensure the
sovereignty of the republic.
So the frigates do not
patrol the territorial
waters of the country.
Indeed the budget to do
anti-piracy patrol does not
even come from the MoD, it
comes from the Department of
Foreign Affairs.
Some of this madness comes
from the first question.
Parliament did not approve
the SDPs and the Government
bought the wrong stuff.
But where Parliament did
come in was the Joint
Defence Committee.
That was chaired by one Tony
Yengeni.
He caused the Defence Review
that delayed Project Sitron
and caused the DoD to
acquire the most expensive
German MEKO 200AS stealth
frigates rather than the far
less expensive Spanish
option from Bazan.
Why?
Because he was paid DM2,5
million to do so by the
German Frigate Consortium.
Why?
Because the German Frigate
Consortium was prepared to
pay some R300 million in
bribes to he, ye and the
party in order to get its
R6,873 billion frigates
contract (including R2,599
billion to the French and
Chippy's and Joe's local
mates at ADS and FBS), this
instead of the R4,5 billion
previous Spanish selection.
But even then in 1998 the
SAN persisted with its far
less expensive Spanish
selection.
But the lure of the German
Frigate Consortium was too
overwhelming.
Why?
Because it paid USD3 million
to Chippy and a group
represented by him to swing
the decision from the
Spanish back to the Germans.
According to Chippy, this
was no easy achievement and
well worth the USD3 million.
That money was paid, through
the British Channel Islands
and a company called Meriam
Ltd.
All set up by Chippy's bosom
buddy Ian Elvis Pierce.
And the money was received
in the republic into the
hands of various juristic
special purpose vehicles.
But that's not all.
The GFC paid another USD22
million.
This time through chief
paymaster Tony Georgadis and
his own master special
purpose vehicle called
Mallar Inc registered in
Liberia.
This is all dinkum.
Not quite proven, but
alleged and highly
plausible, is another USD30
million collected by the
chief's treasurer and
accompanied by a resident
German bagman in Geneva
using a private jet.
Was it the cash in notes or
was it a double PIN of two
Swiss bank accounts.
That we do not know.
Why.
Because it was never
investigated by either the
Scorpions (DSO) or the Hawks
(DPCI).
Sad, because the Swiss
Federal Investigating
Authorities offered copies
of their seized documents,
their co-operation and their
mutual legal assistance.
But this was declined.
By who?
Jeff Radebe, Andries Nel and
their toyboys in the
Ministry of Justice and
National Prosecuting
Authority.
This is a tiny part of the
big story, the big picture.
But it seems hat no one
wants to hear it.
All of it is in any case
known to the National
Prosecuting Authority and
South African Police
Services.
Why? How?
The German Investigating
authorities told them so.
But 16 years later - who
cares?
BTW - Mrs de Lille tabled
her infamous dossier of
allegations in Parliament in
1998, not 1997.
The RFIs were issued by the
DoD in September in 1997.
The cabinet announced the
preferred suppliers in
November 1998.
The signed the supply
contracts in December 1999.
The supply contracts because
effective in April 2000.
Most of the wonga was
splodged after just after
Effective Date of Contract.
The SARB forex records show
some of it.
But some it was paid,m or at
least promised, after
selection of the preferred
suppliers (BAe, Saab, GFC,
GSC). That's when those who
lost out complained and
Congress Consultants took up
the IBM Thinkpad and created
the de Lille Dossier. Two of
its editors are now dead.
RIP.
Hopefully, after writing
this, I will not go the same
way.
But actually, very little of
it is new and mostly it is
in the public domain.